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TERRY AS THE TOUCHSTONE FOR UNLIMITED
AIRPORT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
THE GOVERNMENT ANTI-HIJACKING SECURITY SYSTEM

In an effort to combat the hijacking 1 menace, the United
States Government, with the cooperation of the airline industry,
has instituted a two-part security procedure designed to prevent
would-be hijackers from boarding aircraft within the United
States. The principal elements in this program are the deployment of the "hijacker behavioral profile" and the magnetometer.
Under the present program, certain airline personnel are charged
with screening out potential perpetrators. Selected airline employees are made privy to the contents of the "hijacker behavioral profile," which consists of a set of behavioral characteristics
believed to be common to all potential hijackers. These characteristics, which were first compiled by a special task force instituted by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1969, are
updated periodically as new information, concerning more recent
hijackings, becomes available. This screening procedure and the
use of the magnetometer - a mechanical metal detecting device
- are currently the mainstays of the airport security program.
As part of the security program in many airports, a magnetometer is installed in the boarding passageway leading to the
aircraft so that all passengers must pass through it. The magnetometer is designed to flash a warning light when a metal
object of magnetic force equal to or greater than an average .25
caliber pistol is brought within its operational range.2 At the
I The terms air hijacking, air piracy, and skyjacking are herein used

interchangeably.

2In
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) the
district court described the processes which underlie the use of the magnetometer as follows:
Its operation is based upon the physical fact that the earth is
surrounded by a relatively constant magnetic field composed of lines of
flux. Steel and other ferromagnetic metals are much better conductors
than the air. As a result, when any such metal moves through an area,
nearby magnetic lines of flux are distorted to some degree as they tend
to converge and pass through the metal while seeking the path of least
resistance. Such distortions occurring near a 'fluxgate magnetometer'
create a signal which can be amplified and calibrated to detect magnetic
disturbances. See e.g., Chapman, The Earth's Magnetism, 10-12, 17-19,
27, 28 (2d ed. 1951); J. Jaquet, No-Touch Frisk Electronic Weapons
Detection paper presented at Conference on Electronic Crime Countermeasures, Univ. of Ky., April 22, 1971; Marshall, An Analytic Model
for Fluxgate Magnetometer, IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, Vol.
MAG-3, No. 3 (Sept. 1967); Geyger, Fluxgate Magnetometer Uses
Toroidal Core, Electronics (June 1, 1962) ; Geyger, The Ring-Core
Magnetometer-A New Type of Second-Harmonic Flux-Gate Magnetometer, Communication and Electronics (Mar. 1962).
Id. at 1085.
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same time, if a prospective passenger exhibits traits contained
in the hijacker behavioral profile 3 and activates the magnetometer in the process of boarding the plane, he is interviewed by
airline personnel. Apparently, "if he provides satisfactory
identification he is permitted to board [without impediment] .'"
On the other hand, if the airline personnel are not satisfied with
the interview, the potential passenger is not allowed to board
until a deputy United States Marshall is summoned. The marshall once again will request identification from the passenger.
If the passenger still fails to furnish acceptable identification,
the "selectee" is requested to pass through the magnetometer
once more. Prior to going through the magnetometer again,
the selectee is asked if he has any metal object in his possession.
If he replies in the negative and still activates the magnetometer,
he is requested to undergo a voluntary search before he is permitted to board the aircraft. If he refuses to undergo a voluntary search, he may be merely denied the right to board the
craft, 5 although he may be subjected to an involuntary search.
In United States v. Lopez,6 the district court, in order to
determine the effectiveness and accuracy of the magnetometer
and of its adjunct, the hijacker behavioral profile, reviewed
several sample studies and reported their results. One sample
study consisting of 500,000 screened passengers produced the
following results: only 1,406, or .28 percent, of the passengers
screened exhibited "selectee behavior." Of those exhibiting
"selectee" traits, 694 were nevertheless permitted to board the
aircraft, having failed to activate the magnetometer; leaving 712
or .14 percent to be interviewed. Of the 712 passengers interviewed, only 283, or twenty percent of those originally exhibiting
"selectee" behavior, were frisked. Of the 283, only twenty
persons were denied boarding and, of these, a mere sixteen were
arrested.7 In another sample of 226,000 screened passengers,
3 Informed discussion about the profile is difficult because the characteristics are secret. However, these characteristics are ostensibly based on
the behavioral characteristics of embarking passengers rather than on inherited or social characteristics. Id. at 1086-87. See interview with Dr.
John T. Dailey, Chief Psychologist of the FAA, for a discussion of the basic
theory of the profile, in J. AREY, THE SKY PIRATES 240-41 (© 1972 James A.
Arey).
4 328 F. Supp. at 1083.
5 United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) ; United States v.
Moore, 483 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973) ; but cf., United States v. Doran, 482
F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973). Contra, United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir 1973) United States v.
Miller, 480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. dyzewski, 484 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973).
6328 F. Supp. 1077.
7Id. at 1084
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.57 percent exhibited "selectee" traits, and of these only half
or .28 percent were interviewed and only .13 percent were
searched. Of those searched, only twenty-four persons were
denied boarding.8 In a third study, of a total of 441,000 persons
screened, 303 fit the hijacker behavioral profile, but only nine
arrests were made.9
The basic objective of the preflight passenger surveillance
system and, indeed, of the entire FAA anti-hijacking program is
deterrence. 1 This is based on the assumption that the average
American skyjacker has a "loser" or "failure" personality, and
will be easily discouraged from commandeering an aircraft if
faced with a series of obstacles and problems such as the mysterious psychological profile, a scientific electronic search, an interrogation, and a physical search."
With respect to whether the profile is actually able to detect
potential criminals, Mr. Frank Cardman, Director of Security
of Pan American World Airways, has said:
The profile is not a psychological measurement. It simply qualified the person by age and characteristics of ticket purchase not as somebody who is a potential hijacker, but as2 somebody who
should be looked at further. This is what it does.'
Indeed, it would appear that the profile is not based on what
8

Id.
9 Id.
10 See J. AREY, TkE SKY PIRATES 49 (0 1972 James A. Arey) at 234-42
[hereinafter cited as AREY].
1" Interview with Frank Cardman, Director of Security, Pan American

World Airways, quoted in AREY at 242. Dr. Dailey, speaking of the profile
and the anti-hijacking procedures in general, has stated:
'One common denominator among [skyjackers] is that they are losers, unsuccessful people. They've never done anything very well. They're
failure-prone. They tend to give up when they run up against an obstacle. And they're not very clever. This is the reason we thought,
at first, that we would be able to scare them off-some of them, at least
-by making them believe that hijacking is a very difficult thing to do.
The thing that we faced when we started to fight the epidemic was this
public image of hijacking being the simplest thing in the world to do,
that anybody could do it without risk or failure.'
ARzy. at 99.
: 'This is like anti-submarine or anti-aircraft warfare. What you
try to do is put as many obstacles as possible there to raise the risk
of failure as high as you can. Then, in addition-and I want to stress
this-through the use of public information to make this as vivid as
possible to the right people so they would perceive these obstacles as
maximally discouraging.'
ARY at 270.
Dr. Dailey also said:
Our thought here is that if we are really successful in this we will
never catch anybody, because they'll be afraid. to try and therefore
won't try; but that if they do try, to make every effort to catch as
many as possible .

.

. knowing that we can't catch all of them.

Some

are bound to slip through the screen. No matter what, even if your
policy were one hundred percent search, after a couple of weeks people
would let down and be careless and there would still be some of them
that would get through.'
AREY at 270.
12 AREY at 241.
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might generally be considered the suspicious behavior of passengers, such as perspiration, heavy breathing, confusion, and the
like. Rather, the profile is predicated upon the manner in which
a passenger presents himself for boarding.
Statistics 13 would indicate that the number of successful
and attempted skyjackings since the anti-hijacking procedures
have been implemented have dropped significantly. This data
suggests that present anti-hijacking procedures have been quite
successful in their primary objective of deterring many of the
failures and losers from attempting to skyjack an aircraft, but
there remains a fairly significant number of potential skyjackers
who either do not show similar patterns of behavior or do not
come within the profile. Accordingly, the latter are not being
deterred or detected by the present procedure.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees all individuals freedom from "unreasonable searches
and seizures." The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing4 the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.1
A search is deemed reasonable if conducted pursuant to a
search warrant issued upon probable cause. 15 A search is not
necessarily unreasonable if conducted in the absence of a
warrant. The courts have long recognized a limited number of
exceptions to the warrant requirement. As long as an arrest
is lawful, a warrantless search incident to that arrest is permitted. 6 Moreover, warrantless searches are deemed reasonable
if made with the consent of an accused," or if made in "hot
13N. Thimmesch, Clamps on Hijacking Are Proving Effective, Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 10, 1974, § 2 (Perspective), at 6; McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures - A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORD. L. REV.
293, 295 (1972).
14 U.S.

CONST.

amend. IV.

15 See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973) ; Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Go-Bart Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
17 See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ; Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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pursuit" of a suspect."8 Furthermore, the courts have recently
sanctioned a "stop and frisk" procedure which permits a law
enforcement official to conduct a limited search of an individual
in a public place when the search is based upon a reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause.' 9
As a practical matter, no warrant can be obtained for an
airport search. Even if facts sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause were discovered at the airline boarding gate,
time limitations would effectively preclude the obtaining of a
search warrant. 20 The anti-hijacking security system mandates
swift and effective police action and would be rendered ineffectual by compliance with the time-consuming warrant procedure.
Typically, airport searches cannot be justified on the basis
of the long recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.2 1 Since these foregoing traditional exceptions to the
warrant rule are not applicable to the airport search, the only
justifiable exception is the protective "frisk" for weapons
authorized by Terry v. Ohio. 2 Accordingly, each case that has
focused on the constitutional problems surrounding airport
searches has utilized Terry as its touchstone.
THE TERRY DOCTRINE
In Terry v. Ohio, an experienced Cleveland detective observed Terry and two co-defendants walking repeatedly back
and forth in front of a store, pausing to stare in the same store
window, and conferring with each other at the completion of
the route. The officer became suspicious, believing the men were
" 'casing a job, a stick-up,' 23 and considered it his duty as a
law enforcement officer to investigate further. The officer approached the defendants, identified himself, and asked their
names. When the men mumbled something, the officer spun
Terry around, patted down his outside clothing and felt a bulge
in his coat pocket which proved to be a pistol. Terry was arrested
4
and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction over Terry's
objection that the weapon was seized by means of an unreasonable search. The Court rejected the theory that a "stop-andfrisk" falls outside the category of searches subject to fourth
is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
-, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"ISee text accompanying notes 14-18, supra.
-2 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 6.
'4

State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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amendment limitations because it involves a lesser restraint than
a traditional search.2 5
Traditionally, the reasonableness of a search was controlled
by the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause. In
Terry, the Court introduced the new concept of reasonable suspicion and distinguished it from probable cause as an admittedly
lesser standard justifying a lesser governmental intrusion into
this constitutionally protected area. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that a protective weapons search
could only be performed as incident to an arrest on "probable
cause, 12 6 but, at the same time, it refused to sanction frisks on

mere "inarticulate hunches.""7 The Court concluded that governmental interest in the prevention of crime and the interest
of the individual law enforcement officer in self-protection from
attack by individuals, whom he reasonably suspects to be armed
and whose conduct he is legitimately investigating, are sufficient
28
to justify a limited search for weapons.
As a means of limiting the scope of stop-and-frisk and
thereby avoiding the unreasonableness found in Sibron v. New
York, 29 the Terry Court articulated three factors to be balanced
in determining reasonable suspicion:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer's] conduct as
a general proposition, it is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon
the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for
there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails.' Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 (1967). And in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
.The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
25 392 U.S. at 31.
26 Id. at 26-27.
27Id. at 22. Cf.

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
28 392 U.S. at 30-31.
29 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
In Sibron, a police officer had observed the defendant talking with a number of known narcotics addicts over a period of
eight hours. Relying solely on these observations, the police officer confronted Sibron and said: "You know what I am after." Sibron mumbled
a reply, and as he began to reach into his pocket, the officer intercepted his
hand, reached into the same pocket and discovered envelopes containing
heroin. Sibron was subsequently convicted of unauthorized possession of
narcotics. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d
374 (1966).
The Supreme Court reversed Sibron's conviction, finding that the police
officer did not have probable cause to arrest, and that the frisk was unreasonable because the officer did not have sufficient facts to warrant a belief that Sibron was armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.30
Accordingly, in each airport search, one must examine (1)
the governmental interest justifying the need to search, (2)
the extent of invasion the search entails, and (3) the specific,
articulable facts reasonably warranting the intrusion. With
these Terry criteria as background, we turn now to a discussion
of the cases3" that have considered the validity of the anti-hijacking screening system.

TERRY AND AIRPORT SEARCHES
Early Development
United States v. Lopez3 2 was the first case to consider the
constitutionality of airport screening procedures. A thorough
decision, highly descriptive of the screening procedures, Lopez
has frequently been cited in subsequent cases in this area. 33
Defendant Lopez was designated a "selectee" at the time of
the check-in and was about to board a flight when he activated
a magnetometer. He was then requested to produce identification by the federal marshal on duty. Upon failing to produce
satisfactory identification, Lopez' outer clothing was frisked and
an envelope measuring approximately four inches by six inches
by three-fourths of an inch was taken from him. He was thereupon arrested and charged with concealing and facilitating the
transportation of heroin."
A motion to suppress the evidence was granted and the
case dismissed because the airline had added, to the approved
FAA profile, an ethnic characteristic and other criteria calling
for an individual decision based on the personal judgment of an
airline employee.' 5 The court found that these changes destroyed the essential neutrality and objectivity of the approved
profile.3 6 Nevertheless, it upheld the current anti-hijacking
system, properly supervised, as constitutional and sufficiently
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
Cases which involved searches by airline personnel, not within the
anti-hijacking system, and subsequently held by the courts to be private
searches not protected by the fourth amendment, will not be reviewed in this
article, i.e., United States v. Winstanley, 359 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. La. 1973)
(search turned up marijuana) ; United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813
(8th Cir. 1973) (search turned up marijuana). See also, Airport Security
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1971).
32 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
SE.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 669 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); People v. Erdman, 69
Misc. 2d 103, 106-07, 108, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
34 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082.
30
31

35
Id. at 1101.
3

6 Id.
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accurate in detecting illegal conduct to warrant the type of temporary investigative detention and "frisk" deemed valid in Terry
7

v. Ohio.3

Moreover, in Lopez, Judge Weinstein went to great lengths
to analyze the factors which must be taken into consideration
in determining the reasonableness of the currently used antihijacking security system. Judge Weinstein stated:
A reviewing court must:

(1) determine the objective evidence

then available to the law enforcement officer and (2) decide what
level of probability existed that the individual was armed and about
to engage in dangerous conduct; it must then rule whether that
level of probability justified the 'frisk' in light of (3) the manner
in which the frisk was conducted as bearing on the resentment
it might justifiably arouse in the person frisked (assuming he is
not about to engage in criminal conduct) and the community and
(4) the risk to the officer
and the community of not disarming
8
the individual at once.1

However, in considering the utilization of the magnetometer,
Judge Weinstein noted in Lopez:
Even the use of the magnetometer might be an objectionable
intrusion were it not accompanied by an antecedent warning from
the profile indicating a need to focus particular attention on the
subject. We do not now decide whether, in the absence of some
prior indication of danger, the government may validly require any
citizen to pass through an electronic device which probes beneath
his clothing and effects to reveal what he carries with him. 39
Shortly after Lopez, an airport search situation arose which
presented another court with the precise issue that had been
avoided in Lopez - whether the use of the magnetometer is by
itself a search under the fourth amendment. In United States v.
Epperson,40 a defendant was charged with attempting to board
an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon.
Epperson
handed his ticket to an airline employee at the gate and proceeded toward the plane, activating the magnetometer. Due to
the activation, defendant was searched by a United States marshal who found a loaded pistol on his person. 41 Since there had
been no prior profile designation of defendant as a "selectee,"
the sole basis for stopping and frisking Epperson was his activation of the magnetometer. The court concluded that use of
a magnetometer under these circumstances constituted a
"search," but that the constitution protected only against unreasonable searches:
To require a search warrant as a prerequisite to the use of a magnetometer would exalt form over substance, for it is beyond belief
37 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38
39 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097.
Id. at 1100.
40454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
41 454 F.2d at 770. It should be noted that all passengers were required
to pass by the magnetometer to board the plane. Id.
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that any judicial officer would refuse such a warrant with or without a supporting affidavit. The danger is so well known, the
governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy
so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent
national circumstances.
We think the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and preventing air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and precriminal events, fully justified the minimal
invasion of personal privacy by magnetometer .... 4As to whether the frisk was reasonable, the court held that
once the magnetometer was activated, the personal frisk was
justified because of the marshal's reasonable fear that his safety
and the safety of other passengers was in danger.4 3 The court,
basing its decision on Terry, affirmed defendant's conviction,
stating that:
Since the use of the magnetometer was justified at its inception,
and since the subsequent physical frisk was justified by the information developed by the magnetometer, and since the search was
limited in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, we hold the search
and seizure not unrea44
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In another airport situation, United States v. Slocum,"
wherein the defendant met the profile as well as activated the
magnetometer, the court followed the rationale of Epperson.
After defendant was unable to produce any identification, the
marshal frisked him and found nothing which could have activated the magnetometer. The marshal then searched defendant's hand luggage in which he found a rolled-up sock containing a "definite foreign substance," which, upon inspection,
46
proved to be cocaine.
The conviction of Slocum for the possession of narcotic
drugs was affirmed. The court, relying on Epperson, held that
a magnetometer search per se was justified "within the context
of a potential hijacking. ' 4 7 The court, noting that the use of
the profile should not be "considered as an attempt to establish
probable cause and, therefore . . . subject to scrutiny according

to Fourth Amendment standards, '"41 found the search to be
reasonable in view of defendant's lack of identification and
failure to explain what caused the activation of the magne49
tometer.
The above cases confirmed the constitutionality of the currently used airport anti-hijacking procedures. These decisions
42 Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 772.
44 Id.

45 464

F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1181.
47 Id. at 1182.
48 Id. at 1183.
46

49 Id.
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readily display the growing liberal view with which the diverse

circuits look upon this procedure.

The courts have made a

complete turnabout, since their Lopez decision, as to the grounds

justifying the airport search.

Lopez required a passenger to

meet the "profile" before a magnetometer test or a frisk could
be conducted. On the other hand, Epperson held the magnetometer search as reasonable within the requirements of the

fourth amendment and allowed a frisk to be conducted if the
magnetometer was activated.

There are at present essentially three major theories which
are followed in the various circuits in order to justify the sometime extensive searches conducted under the guise of hijacking prevention. The following discussion will attempt to analyze
those theories as developed by circuits 0 which have dealt with
the question.
The Limited Airport Search in Light of TERRY:
The Second and Eighth Circuits
The Second Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the
current anti-hijacking procedure. However, it has insisted that
the procedure be used within the "reasonable suspicion" guidelines announced in Terry, and has held that in the absence of
such a basis the search would violate fourth amendment guarantees.
In United States v. Bell, 1 Bell was convicted for failure to
pay a narcotics tax.5 2 Bell met the "profile" and activated the
magnetometer." s A federal marshal then approached him, and,
after ascertaining Bell's lack of identification and his criminal
background,'54 searched him and found a quantity of heroin. 5
5"Note, however, that no airport search cases have been reported to
date in the First, Sixth and Tenth Circuits.
51464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
52 Id. at 668, n. 1.
t3 Cf., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972) where
the court upheld a search of the defendant's jacket based upon the activation
of the magnetometer alone. As Epperson passed through the instrument it
registered an unusually high reading. He was asked to put aside whatever
metallic objects he possessed; but when the device was again activated, the
United States Marshal searched his jacket and discovered a loaded pistol.
In United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971) the level of suspicion which justified the frisk was concededly lower than that in Terry.
Noticing Lindsey's anxious behavior as he entered the boarding lounge, the
marshal requested to see an identification. The defendant produced four each bearing a different name. The marshal noted two bulges in the defendant's coat and a subsequent frisk revealed two aluminum-wrapped
packages later found to contain heroin. Noting the exigencies of the situation, a panel of the Third Circuit held that the level of suspicion was sufficiently high to justify the stop and frisk.
54 Bell had two previous convictions, "and at the time of his arrest
(by the marshal], stated that he was out on bail from the Tombs for attempted murder and narcotics charges ...
" 464 F.2d at 672.
5' Id. at 669.
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Bell's motion to suppress the evidence was denied"6 and his conviction subsequently affirmed."
The district court, relying on Lopez, 5 found the anti-hijacking procedure constitutional. 9 The profile selection was held
to have been applied properly and without any prejudices.60
On the issue of the search, the district court stated it would
have had some reservation had the search been based only on the
magnetometer, inasmuch as the magnetometer was activated by
nearly fifty percent of all passengers. 61 However, the court concluded that "the magnetometer must be viewed within the
context of the anti-hijacking system, ' 62 and "is only one of a
series of screening procedures; a procedure that serves as
' 63
much as a deterrent to air piracy as it does a detector.
Judge Mulligan, writing for a unanimous court, characterized as "baseless" Bell's .contention that the use of the magne-

tometer constituted an unreasonable search, since "[n]one of
the personal indignities of the frisk discussed by Chief Justice
Warren in Terry [were] present. '64 The use of the magne-

tometer was considered to be a reasonable precaution in view of
the magnitude of the crime sought to be prevented and the
exigencies of time which clearly precluded the obtaining of a
warrant. 5 The court further rationalized its decision by stating
that: "Obviously the most appropriate point to conduct the in5 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
57 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
59 335 F. Supp. at 799.
60 Id. at 800-01.
58

61 Id. at 802.
62

Id.

63 Id.

64 464 F.2d at 673.

65 Id., Chief Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, opined that the
limited airport search could be justified by the danger alone, as long as the
defendant is aware of his ability to avoid the search by refusing to board the
aircraft. Id. at 674-75. Chief Judge Friendly stated:
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions
of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a
large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so
long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the
passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search
so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air. [Footnote
omitted].

Id. at 675.

Judge Mansfield, although concurring in the result, cautioned:
If the danger to the public posed by the current wave of hijacking
were held to constitute adequate ground for such a broad expansion of
police power, the sharp increase in the rate of serious crimes in our
major cities could equally be used to justify similar searches of persons
or homes in high crime areas based solely upon the 'trained intuition' of
the police. With the door thus opened, a serious abuse of individual
rights would almost inevitably follow.
History reveals that the initial steps in the erosion of individual
rights are usually excused on the basis of an 'emergency' or threat to
the public. But the ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees
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quiry and to make the limited search of outer clothing is on the

''
ground before takeoff. 6

In United States v. Ruiz-Estrella,'6 the Second Circuit was
called upon once again to determine the reasonableness of an
airport search. Defendant was convicted in the district court
of various firearms offenses.6
Defendant met the "profile" and
was requested to present identification at the check-in counter. 9
Ruiz-Estrella was designated a profile "selectee" and was requested to identify himself again, by the uniformed federal
marshal, upon reaching the boarding gate.7 0 The marshal was
dissatisfied and informed defendant that he would have to go
through a luggage search. Defendant turned over the shopping
71
bag he was carrying, which appeared to be filled with toys.
The marshal picked up one of the toy boxes for examination.
After noting that the original cellophane wrapping had been
retaped, and finding the box to be unexpectedly heavy, he opened
it to find a sawed-off shotgun and several shells.72 At no time
did the defendant pass through or activate a magnetometer.7
Ruiz-Estrella was excluded from a significant part of his own
74
suppression hearing, and his motion to suppress was denied.
The Court of Appeals reversed, 5 holding the exclusion of
defendant from the suppression hearing to be inconsistent with
the same court's holdings in United States v. Clark76 and Bell,7 7 as
well as in violation of defendant's "rights of confrontation and
public trial. ' 71 As to the merits, the prosecution attempted to
justify the search on the basis of consent. However, the court
held that "the prosecution's burden could not be met by only
showing acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority,"7 9 "[n] or
can the posters (warning of the search procedures in the airlies in their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility
alike.
No necessity exists for punching a hole in the Fourth Amendment
in order to enable the FAA and airline authorities to deal effectively
with the air piracy problem.
Id. at
66 675-76.
Id. at 673-74.
67 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
68 Id. at 723.
69 Id. at 724.
70
71
7

Id.

Id. at 725.

2Id.
73 Id. at 729.

There was apparently no metal-detecting device present
in the particular gate where this incident took place. Id. n. 7.
74 Id. at 724.
75
Id. at 726.
76 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973).
77 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
7
8 481F.2d 723 725.
79 Id. at 727; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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port) be relied upon for . . . a showing"80 of voluntary consent
to the search. The court concluded that "it is clear that the
posters do not alert passengers to their ability to avoid search
'
by refusing to board' s1
and are therefore insufficient to constitute implied consent.
Next the court considered whether the seizure could be
82
justified on the less-than-probable cause standard of Terry.The court concluded in the negative, reasoning that "RuizEstrella neither passed through nor activated a magnetometer, "he did nothing at all during the period in question that
could be construed as suspicious in nature. '83 The defendant's
conduct, the court reasoned, was insufficient to meet the "articulable facts" standard necessary under Terry in order to conduct
a stop-and-frisk.8 4 The court, once again, reiterated its holding
in Bell,8 5 emphasizing "that the use of a magnetometer is a 'reasonable caution' " in view of the magnitude of the societal interest
involved and the absence of "the personal indignities of the
frisk. 8 6 The court concluded that it would not condone any
airport searches, in the absence of probable cause, unless the
person was first exposed to the minimal invasion of privacy resulting from the use of the magnetometer, 7 activated it, and
thereby produced some quantum of "specific and articulable
facts" upon which a Terry "reasonable suspicion" search could
be based.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Kroll, 88 has decided
to adhere strictly to the Terry rationale and reasoning as it
applies to airport searches. In Kroll, defendant was designated
a "selectee." After he identified himself satisfactorily, he passed
through the magnetometer, which was activated by the metal
hinges and locks on the attache case he carried.8 9 Kroll was
asked to open the attache case, which he did. A United States
marshal working with security at the airport pulled out an
ordinary white business envelope from the file section of the
case.90 It was light weight, had a very minute bulge at one
end of the envelope and was otherwise limp and flat. 91 Searching
80 481 F.2d 723, 728; accord, United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp.
1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ; United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1973) ; United States v. Moore, 483 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973); but cf.
United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973).

81 481 F.2d 723, 728-29.
82 Id. at 729.
83 Id. (footnote omitted).
84 Id.
85

464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).

86

491 F.2d 723, 729 (citations omitted).

87

Id.

s8 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
89
90 Id. at 885.

Id.

91 Id.
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for weapons, the marshal opened the envelope to find an amphetamine and a partly-consumed marijuana cigarette.9 2
The district court granted defendant's pre-trial motion to
suppress the evidence. 9" But that did not end Judge Collinson's
inquiry since he realized that "[a] search which is reasonable
at its inception may yet violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue
of its intolerable intensity and scope. '94 In this case the district
court found that the search of the envelope was unreasonable.9 5
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, quoting extensively from the district court's decision.96 On the issue of consent to the search,
the court held:
Compelling the defendant to choose between exercising Fourth
Amendment rights and his right to travel constitutes coercion; the
government cannot be said to have established that the defendant
freely and voluntarily consent [sic] to the search when to do other-7

wise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to travel.
Moreover, the court, relying on Terry, held that "inspection of
the envelope's contents exceeded the scope of the search permissible under the circumstances." 98 It further limited the scope
of the search by adopting the district court's language, stating
that "an officer is limited at the initial stage by the probabilities
of a situation and reasonable suspicion is required before the
search may be expanded." 9 °
Thus, it may be concluded that in the Eighth Circuit express consent is necessary for an airport search or, in its absence, a search will be strictly limited by the rationale of Terry,
requiring something more than "mere suspicion" in order for an
officer to engage in an expanded search.
Other circuit courts of appeal however have not shown the
concern the Second and Eighth Circuits have shown in keeping
airport searches subject to the protection afforded by the fourth
amendment. 0
The Exigent CircumstancesDoctrine:
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has found airport security searches to be an "exceptional and exigent situation under
92 Id. at 885-86. The United States marshal opened the envelope due to
his subjective belief, based on his limited military experience, that nitroglycerine or other explosives could have been placed in flat, limp envelope,
which was carried in defendant's attache case. Id. at 884.
93 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
94 Id. at 153.

95 Id.

96 481 F. 2d 884.
,7 Id. at 886 (footnote omitted). Also see note 151, infra.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 887.
100E.g., United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United
States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lindsey, 451
F. 2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
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the Fourth Amendment" 10 ' and therefore not protected by it.
In United States v. Moreno,'10 2 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of defendant on a charge of unlawful possession of
heroin. 0 3 On the day in question Moreno arrived by plane at
the San Antonio Airport, where he was observed by a veteran
federal marshal who noticed that defendant was unusually wary
of the airport security guards.1 0 4 Defendant left the airport and
returned about two hours later, when he was observed once
The marshal kept defenagain by the same federal marshal. 0
dant under observation while he was attempting to purchase a
ticket at several different counters, until he finally purchased
one. 106 After purchasing the ticket Moreno went into a restroom, followed by the federal marshal. Once inside, the marshal
noticed a prominent bulge on the left side of Moreno's coat,
which aroused his suspicion. 10 7 The marshal approached Moreno, identified himself, and requested Moreno to identify himself. After being dissatisfied with Moreno's identification, he
removed him to the security office."" 8 At the security office a
pat down search was conducted, after which defendant was
requested to remove his coat. The ensuing search yielded the
heroin involved in the case. 10 9 Prior to trial, defendant made a
motion to suppress. This was denied by the district court," 0 on
the ground that the arresting agents were reasonably justified
in believing that Moreno might be armed and dangerous.
The issue presented to the Fifth Circuit in this case was the
constitutional propriety of an airport search and seizure.11 The
court held that the disposition of this case was controlled by the
rationale of Terry v. Ohio."' 2 Judge Gewin, writing for the
court, found that searches based on Terry are reasonable when
the officer feels that either his safety or the safety of others is
jeopardized. In this case the court found the safety of "others"
to be the prime concern of the officer.11 3 The court went on to
say that "[d]ue to the gravity of the air piracy problem, we
101 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United
Note Judge Goldberg's
States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
concurring opinion on the exception announced by the court Id. at 414;
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973) ; But cf. United
States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973).
102475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
103 Id.
104

Id. at 45.

105 Id. at 46.

106 Id.
107

Id.

108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Moreno district court decision unreported.
"1 475 F.2d at 45.
112 Id. at 46.
113 Id. at 47.
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think that the airport, like the border crossing,1 " is a critical
zone in which special fourth amendment considerations apply.""'
In fact the court found airport security searches to be an "exceptional and exigent situation under the Fourth Amendment."

6

Although ostensibly relying on the rationale of Terry, the
court finds it necessary to extend Terry in order to justify its
holding. The court concludes that limiting the airport search
to a "pat down" as required by Terry, would be "self-defeating""' and upholds the more extensive search conducted in the
case. It rationalizes the extension of Terry, stating:
[Tihe hijacker can conceal explosives or weapons in places which
might be overlooked in the course of a cursory pat down. It
should be emphasized that such a search is not primarily for the
investigating officer's protection, but rather for the protection of
a distinct and uniquely threatened class - this nation's air carriers, their crews and passengers." 8
No mention is made by this court of the absence of the recognized
anti-hijacking devices, the "profile" and the magnetometer. Nor
does the court discuss the fact that defendant was stopped in
the airport restroom, 11"9 not while attempting to board an aircraft. This case seems to clearly violate the settled principle
20
It
that searches are not to be justified by what they turn up.
may be concluded from this case that in the Fifth Circuit, an
airport search, like a border search, may be initiated without any
probable cause. 2'
Inasmuch as the Fifth Circuit has made
airport searches another exemption, heretofore not recognized,"'
from the usual fourth amendment requirements that searches be
based on probable cause, it would seem that an airport search
within the Fifth Circuit would be held constitutionally reasonable
if based on any kind of suspicious conduct by a ticketed would-be
23
passenger, present in any of the environs of an airport.
Although the Fifth Circuit imposes a limitation on its
114 Customs officials conducting border searches have always been exempt
from the usual fourth amendment requirement that searches be based on

probable cause. Aside from the historical argument that this exception has
always been recognized, it is also justified by the vital national interest in
preventing illegal entry and smuggling, particularly of narcotics.

Although

under some circumstances searches can be conducted away from the border
crossing area, all persons searched must be shown to have come through
that critical zone to make this exception to the warrant requirement applicable.

The mere suspicion of possible illegal activity is enough cause to justify

a border search. See United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 832 (5th Cir.
1971) ; Annot., Validity of Border Searches and Seizures by Customs Officers, 6 A.L.R. FED. 317 (1971).
115 475 F.2d at 51.
16 Id. at 48.
117 Id.
118 Id.
"9
120
121

12

at 51.

See note 107, supra.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
See notes 14-18 and 113, supra.

2' United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States
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exigent circumstances doctrine in United States v. Garay,"4
it abandoned it shortly thereafter in United States v. Cyzewski."2
In United States v. Garay, a conviction of possession of
marijuana, uncovered pursuant to a warrantless search of defendant's checked luggage, (which was already aboard the plane)
was reversed and remanded.12
The court did not find the case
to be within the "exigent circumstances" exception.1 27 The court
reasoned:
While the exigencies of the situation may well have justified
the warrantless detention of appellants, they cannot validate the
search of the suitcases made at a time when appellants were under
restraint, if not under formal arrest. At that point, appellants
were incapable of concealing or destroying the suitcases or their
contents.
In short, the officers could and should have held the bags until they
obtained a warrant authorizing an examination of their contents.1 2
Three months later, in United States v. Cyzewski, 2 the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Garay as being "unrelated to the
security problem."' 13 In Cyzewski, the district court suppressed
five pounds of marijuana discovered by an airport security
search of the retrieved checked luggage of the defendants.' 3 ' The
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the warrantless search
of the checked luggage was reasonable"1'- "[i] n the context of the
exigent circumstances . . . and the plight of American aviation. 1' 1 3
In this case, defendants were designated "selectees"
and upon arriving at the boarding area were requested to identify themselves. 34 When they failed to produce satisfactory identification, claiming it was in their checked luggage, the deputy
United States marshal requested that defendants' luggage be
retrieved in order to confirm their identification. Defendants
were removed to the marshal's office, where they produced identification which revealed they were traveling under assumed
names. 3-5 When the luggage arrived, defendants were requested
to pass through the magnetometer with their luggage. When
v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d

1272 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Miller, 480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973) ;
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 1973) (Thornberry,
J., dissenting); but cf., United States v. Soriano, 482 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973).
124477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973).
125

484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973).
F.2d at 1307-08,
Id.

126 477
127

128 Id. at 1308.
129 484 F.2d 509

10 Id. at 512.
131 Id. at 509.
132 Id.

133 Id. at 511.
1Id. at 510.
135

Id.

(5th Cir. 1973) (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
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the magnetometer was activated by one of the defendants, the
marshals decided to search that suitcase despite the defendant's
explanation as to what metal object activated the device. 136 As
a result of said search the marshal discovered the marijuana
37
concealed in defendant's laundry.
The Court of Appeals, Judge Roney writing for the majority, was well aware that it was expanding the heretofore
recognized scope of airport searches. In his opening statement,
Judge Roney noted:
In this case, an airport security search goes one step further
than any to which this court has previously given constitutional
approbation.' 3
The court found that a search based on mere or unsupported
suspicion of the person, analogous to a border search, as upheld
in United States v. Skipwith,139 was too restrictive. Nor was
the court satisfied with the decisions of United States v. Moreno 40 and United States v. Legato,'4 ' upholding searches on mere
suspicion, without search warrants, in the airport restroom and
parking lot, respectively, as constitutionally permissible despite
the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the court deterred by decisions in other circuits limiting the scope of airport searches,
reasoning that they all sustained airport security procedures
1 42
just the same.
The court went on to announce the new scope of an airport
search:
The search may continue until the law enforcement official satisfies
himself that no harm would come from the passengers boarding the
plane. To be effective, the security efforts must focus not on a
single aircraft or tangible item, but on the suspect himself, his
demeanor 43and possessions during the entire course of his airport
presence.
This court specifically rejected the argument that an investigation need be curtailed if the passenger elects not to board, thereby rejecting the right-to-leave argument announced in United
States v. Meulener.'4 The court set forth the limits of the
search:
Only when it becomes unreasonable for the suspect's innocence to
be further questioned does the security search itself become unreasonable.
The limits of a constitutional search are not necessarily defined by
136 Id.
137

Id.

138 Id.
139 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).

140

475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).

141480

142 484 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1973).

14'Id. at 513.
144

351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ; 484 F.2d 509, 513, n. 4.
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the perimeter of a particular security system. The marshals'
specified authority should not bar further investigation if, in the
exercise of their professional judgment, their reasonable
suspi14
cions had not been allayed by the routine security check. '
Under the above test the court upheld the search of the retrieved
checked luggage, reasoning that "at no point in the authorized
security procedure did defendants' innocence become clear to the
marshals. ' ' 1 4 6 Moreover, the court found that a "pat down" is
not an inflexible preliminary requirement for a search under
Terry,14 7 thereby finding Terry really not controlling in airport
searches.
Judge Thornberry, in his dissent,'4 summarizes the Fifth
Circuit's position regarding airport searches:
In our Circuit not even reasonable suspicion is required to
search passengers in the preboarding area. In United States v.
Skipwith, 5th Cir. 1973, 482 F.2d 1272, we held that 'those who
actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier . . .
are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion.'
Id. at 1276. Consent is not required; the 4 individual has no right
to leave to avoid the search. Id. at 1277.1 9
The sole reason given by the court for paring back the individual's right under the fourth amendment is "the magnitude of
the perils created by air piracy"' 150 and their inhibiting effect
on citizens' exercise of the constitutional right to travel. 151 It
would be well to note the analogy the dissent makes which places
the ruling in this case in the proper perspective:
Even a probable-cause arrest of a suspect would not legitimate a
search of his checked luggage as incident to the arrest. Chimel v.
California, 1969, 395 U.S. 752.152
The dissent further reasons:
The screening procedures prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration are designed to thwart the carry-on threat and do not
provide for searching or magnetometer testing of checked luggage.
Unless the nexus between the checked luggage and the danger of
air piracy is established, the 'protective search' rationale cannot
properly be used to uphold a checked luggage search. 153
145 Id.

146 Id.
147 Id.
148

Id.

at 514.
at 515.

Id. at 516, n. 1.
150 See note 122, supra.
151 The right to travel was early recognized as one of the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by American citizens. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); see also Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (Douglas & Jackson, J.J., concurring); and Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Recent constitutional jurisprudence has established that the right to travel emanates from the due process clause of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Sec'y
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
152 484 F.2d at 517.
153 Id. at 518.
149
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The dissenting judge concludes that he can see no substantial
skyjacking threat presented in the checked luggage and would
therefore hold that the search went beyond its legitimate "protective" scope.15 4 Such a decision would have been in line with
5
the same court's earlier holding in Garay,'"
which seems to be
inapposite to the holding in this case. It would be well to heed
the warning issued by Judge Goldberg in his concurring opinion
in Legato, s6 which is quoted by Judge Thornberry in this dissenting opinion:
The exigencies of skyjacking and bombing, however real and dire,
should not leave an airport and its environs an enclave where the
Fourth Amendment has taken its leave. It is passing strange that
most of these airport searches find narcotics and not bombs, which
might cause us to pause in our rush toward malleating the Fourth
Amendment in order to keep the bombs from exploding. 57
The only Seventh Circuit case to date dealing with an air58
port search, United States v. Fern,1
follows the exigent circumstances doctrine of the Fifth Circuit. In Fern, while defendant
was sitting in a lounge in the boarding area pretending to read a
newspaper, he was noticed by a United States marshal who determined that he met the "profile" characteristics. 59 Defendant
was not subjected to a magnetometer test. A search of defendant's person produced nothing. Next the marshal searched
defendant's flight bag in which he discovered a plastic bag filled
with heroin and two bricks of smoking opium. 60° The district
court convicted Fern of knowingly possessing heroin and opium,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.161
The sole issue presented to the court on appeal was whether
the airport search of defendant violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
62
court answered in the negative. The court, relying on Moreno,"
found that airport security searches should be treated as an exceptional and exigent situation under the Fourth Amendment. 8
The court also held, relying on United States v. Lindsey,14 that
"the use of a magnetometer is not an absolute prerequisite to an
'
airport-boarding search. "16s
It can be clearly concluded from this case that something
less than the Terry level of suspicion necessary for a stop-and4 Id.
155 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973).
156 480 F.2d 408, 414 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

484 F.2d 509,515.
484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973) (Gordon, J., dissenting).
9Id. at 667.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 666.
162 475 F.2d 44.
163484 F.2d at 669.
164451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
165 484 F.2d at 668.
157
158
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frisk is required in the Seventh Circuit in order to initiate an
airport search. In fact, such a search will not be limited to a
pat-down as required by Terry, 6 6 and it may be initiated on the
67

sole ground that defendant met the "behavioral profile."9
Judge Gordon, in his dissenting opinion, concludes that the
Terry type "stop-and-frisk" is inapplicable in this case, a conclusion with which this author fully agrees.'
The dissent fur-

ther cautions that there exists a need to resist the pressure of
official expedience against the protection of the Fourth Amend-

ment."6 9
The Implied Consent Doctrine: The Ninth Circuit
Cases dealing with airport searches within the Ninth Circuit
have been decided on either of two bases: consent 70 or implied
consent 7' to be searched. United States v. Meulener 1"2 was the

first case to announce the theory that voluntary consent to be
searched was necessary. It stated that a passenger had to be
apprised of his choice of either undergoing the search or declining to board. Meulener also held that "the government [cannot]

condition the exercise of the defendant's constitutional right to
travel on the voluntary relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment

rights. ' 17 3

Subsequent cases and their interpretation of these

holdings will be the subject of the following discussion.
In Meulener, defendant was designated a "selectee" and
activated the magnetometer when he passed through it with his

suitcase. 74 A marshal then ordered defendant to open his suitcase, in which he found some marijuana.' 7 ' Prior to the time the
suitcase was searched, no attempt had been made to search the
defendant's person. 17 6
The district court held:
[T]he defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
he was not told at the time the search was initiated that he had a
166 Id. at 669.
167 The only reason for initiating the search in this case was the determination by the United States marshal that defendant met the "behavioral
profile." Id. at 667.

16s Id. at 669-70.
169 Id. at 670.

1 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) ; United States
v. Crain, 485 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973) ; see also, United States v. Moore, 483
F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284
(C.D. Cal. 1972).
171 United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973).
172 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ; also see note 98, supra.
Contra, United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Winstanley, 359 F. Supp. 146, 153 (E.D. La. 1973).
173 351 F. Supp. at 1288.
Accord, United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886
(8th Cir. 1973) ; see also note 151, supra.
174 351 F. Supp. at 1285.
175 Id.

171

Id. at 1286.
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right to refuse
to submit to the search provided he did not board
77

the airline.

As to the issue of whether defendant consented to the search, the
court held "the government [cannot] condition the exercise of
the defendant's constitutional right to travel on the voluntary
relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights.' 7 8 The court
also held, relying on Terry:
[T]he failure of the marshal to make an initial pat-down of the
defendant's outer clothing before searching his suitcase prevents
the search from coming within the Terry penumbra and makes it
violative of the Fourth Amendment. A limited pat-down search
which reveals the metal object responsible for the positive magnetometer 1 reading obviates the necessity for a search of the
suitcase.

17

'

The court reasoned that while there was a governmental interest
justifying the search of passengers who actually board the plane,
no such interest existed with respect to persons who merely appear at the boarding gate and do not board, and accordingly a
search of the latter would be held unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 180
In the subsequent case of United States v. Davis,'81 the

Ninth Circuit followed the rationale of Meulener and held that a
preboarding screening of all passengers and their carry-on
luggage to detect the presence of weapons and explosives is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if the person is given
the right to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft.'8 2

The court reasoned that the regulations establishing the airport
screening program did not authorize nor require compelled
searches. 18 3 However, it should be noted that the Davis court
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1288.
1' Id. at 1292.
(5th Cir. 1973).

Contra, United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 515

180 351 F. Supp. at 1290.

Note the excellent review of the history
181 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
of hijacking and measures taken to prevent it by the FAA and the airlines
given in the opinion by Judge Browning.
182 Id. at 912.
Accord, United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752
(N.D. Cal. 1972) ; cf. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (imposing requirement that passengers have "advance notice",
of liability to search).
183 482 F.2d at 911.
The FAA directive is explicit: the right to board is
conditioned upon submission to a "consent" search. No more is permitted by
statute. 49 U.S.C. § 1511 authorized air carriers "to refuse transportation
to a passenger or to refuse to transport property" if the transportation would
be "inimical to safety of flight" (emphasis added). And see, Hearings on
Aviation Safety and Aircraft Piracy Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., at 106 (1970) (testimony of
Acting FAA Administrator David . Thomas).
The proposed Air Transportation Security Act of 1973, basically a
codification of the relevant aspects of the present airport screening search
program, also stresses that such searches are "consent" searches. See S.
REP. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1973) (discussing section
316 (a) (1) of the proposed Act): even after a passenger activates the
magnetometer, he is subject to a search or frisk "only if he first voluntarily
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did not rely on Terry to justify airport searches.

Rather, the

court found the airport search program to be analogous to an
"administrative

search"

and looked to cases involving such
searches to find the appropriate standards for evaluating an
8
airport search.

4

To pass constitutional muster, an administrative search must
meet the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness:
[A]n administrative screening search must be as limited in its
intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it. It follows that airport screening searches
are valid only if they recognize the right 1of
a person to avoid
8
search by electing not to board the aircraft. '

This court also limited the second holding in Meulener, regarding
the constitutional right to travel. 186 In Davis the court stated:
[E]xercise of the constitutional right to travel may not be conditioned upon the relinquishment of another constitutional right
(here, the Fourth Amendment right to be 8 free
of unreasonable
7
search),

absent a compelling state interest.

Thus it would appear that this court would condition the right
to travel upon the relinquishment of the Fourth Amendment
right if the state could show a compelling state interest for so
doing.
Moreover, although the court ruled out implied consent in
this case, it did not rule out the possibility that implied consent

could be the basis for an airport search when the nature and
scope of airport searches become widely known.18 8 In fact, in
consents. If such consent is denied then the individual shall forfeit his opportunity on that occasion to be transported and the air carrier shall deny
his passage."
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate
Commerce Committee on January 10, 1973, Secretary Volpe "identif[ied]
the features which our program has in common with S.39,' the above proposed Act, as follows:
Specifically, the regulations recently issued by FAA follow S.39 by
requiring the screening of passengers by weapon-detectors. Additionally,
the FAA regulations direct the air carriers to deny boarding to any
person who is not cleared by a detection device, or if such equipment is
not available, does not consent to the search of his person for a weapon
and to refuse to permit any person to carry aboard any property which
he does not consent to have inspected.
(emphasis added).
Assistant Attorney General Will R. Wilson testified before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce as follows:
My feeling is that a general surveillance of the public in the way of a
search or otherwise, in getting on a plane, must be done administratively
some way and probably the nearest way that that can be made constitutional is through a consent procedure in the buying of a ticket or
something like that.
Hearings on Aviation Safety and Aircraft Piracy Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 82 (Feb. 5,
1970).
184 482 F.2d at 908 and n. 40.
185 Id. at 910-11.
186 351 F. Supp. at 1288 (footnote omitted).
.87 482 F.2d at 913 (footnote omitted).
188 Id. at 914.
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United States v. Doran, the Ninth Circuit using the above conclusions from Davis, held that consent in fact to a search of
defendant's carry-on bag at an airport could be inferred from
the fact that signs and public address warnings announced that
all passengers were subject to search.'8 9
It may thus be concluded that in the Ninth Circuit, now
that airport searches are widely known and mandatory throughout the country, a passenger attempting to board an aircraft has
impliedly consented to have his carry-on luggage searched. It
might also be concluded that under the rationale and reasoning
of the above cases, a search following refusal to permit a passenger to board an aircraft will not be constitutional without at
least some "articulable facts" which Terry held necessary to
justify a stop-and-frisk. Mere suspicion would not be suffici90
ent.'
CONCLUSION

The cases discussed above have upheld the anti-hijacking
system only by employing increasingly broad interpretations of
the Terry doctrine. The courts, in many of the cases, faced the
problem of whether the airport marshal, at the time he stopped
the embarking passenger to frisk him, had knowledge of "specific
and articulable facts" warranting the particular search, as required by Terry,"' or whether the frisk was based on nothing
more than a series of "inarticulate hunches. 119 2 Statistics indicate that less than twenty percent of the arrests stemming from
the anti-hijacking system have been for offenses related to aircraft security. 93 It would, therefore, seem not unreasonable to
characterize the circumstances relied upon to justify these
searches as hunches. A continuation of this procedure may lead
to the obvious danger "that the screening of passengers and their
189 482 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973).

:90 United States v. Moore, 483 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1973).
191
192

392 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 22.

'If See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
The record is not entirely comforting in this respect. Over 33% of the arrests have been for
possessory drug offenses, and the remainder for such miscellaneous charges
as parole violation and illegal entry into the United States.
A report of the Commerce Committee on the U.S. Senate states:
[llt has been reported that certain classes of individuals, such as
young people and oddly attired individuals have been harassed and
intimidated by general frisks or shakedowns without any prior indication
or probable cause that such persons were unlawfully carrying weapons.
We find this a deplorable practice, abhorrent to individual freedom and
the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution.
See S. REP. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1973).
General Benjamin 0. Davis, Ass't Secretary of Transportation, has also
expressed some concern: "I think it's true that some people have been doing
some searching for narcotics violations. And I think there is a danger in
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will be subverted
carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives 194
into a general search for evidence of crimes.
The Lopez court sustained the constitutionality of the antihijacking system by relying heavily on the profile to provide
some factual basis on which to hinge the magnetometer search
and the subsequent stop-and-frisk. But as already noted, the
profile does not purport to identify potential hijackers; it is
merely a compilation of innocuous characteristics. The profile
is simply a means of classifying a person "as someone who should
' 19
be looked at further.
Later cases like Epperson and Slocum appear to have abondoned the need for a factual basis insofar as the magnetometer
search is concerned.
These cases justify the magnetometer
search as "reasonable" in view of the exigent circumstances and
the minor inconvenience to travelers, and further sustain the
reasonableness of the subsequent stop-and-frisk on the basis of
the magnetometer. However, cases in the Third Circuit have
found the stop-and-frisk to be reasonable despite the absence of
a prior magnetometer search,19 while cases in the Second Circuit
found a stop-and-frisk to be unreasonable in the absence of a
prior magnetometer search.19 7 Some of the recent cases in the
this form of civil rights standpoint that has me worried."
26, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
See also, J. AREY, THE SKY PIRATEs 242 (1972)

N.Y. Times, Nov.

(quoting Frank Card-

man, Director of Security for Pan American World Airways):
'We've shaken down people-just by virtue of experience, say sky
marshal or customs experience-we've shaken down any number of
people that we've found thoroughly undesirable to have aboard an airplane, but are not basically hijackers. Narcotics! -we're knocking off
people day after day carrying the hard stuff.'
And see the following testimony by FAA Administrator Schaffer:
We have law enforcement information now available. In other
words, we are going to scrub down the manifest. People buy tickets on
airlines and make reservations; once their name appears, we then start
the process. Is this man evading the law? Is he a known international
operator? Has he any record at all? And it is possible we will even
find out about their medical record, meaning, have they a record of
being in mental institutions, and so on, because a great many of our
hijackings have involved mentally deranged people taking this as a
way of getting recognition or a way of calling attention to themselves,
or for whatever other purposes.
So, if we have all of this information being brought to bear, gathered from all the sources available to us, intelligence sources, law enforcement sources, airline security, local police, all of this, there is a
good chance that we will really have an antiseptic passenger list, in
time.
Aircraft Hijacking Hearings, note 183, supra, at 102.

In another study,

statistics indicated that fourteen out of every fifteen persons of those
searched under the present anti-hijacking system were found not to be
carrying weapons. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
194 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 (9th Cir. 1973)
(footnote
omitted).
195 AREY at 241.
196 United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
197 United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Fifth and Seventh Circuits have gone so far as to hold airport
searches, in general, sui generis under the fourth amendment,
analogous to a "border search," and hence not burdened by the
usual reasonableness requirements of most searches and seiz98
ures.
Since the results of either a personal "profile" or a magnetometer search can provide no more than a hunch as the basis
for a subsequent frisk, searches based on them necessarily involve no more than "mere suspicion." By paring the need for
specific articulable facts, the three-factor rule in Terry has been
truncated to a two-factor rule whereby anyone may be stopped
and frisked, provided the governmental interest is substantial
and the personal intrusion slight, and regardless of whether
there exists any "specific and articulable facts."
Moreover, recent decisions indicate a still further expansion
of Terry by omitting considerations of the extent of invasion the
search entails. In Cyzewski,99 the court went so far as to authorize the seizure and search of a passenger's checked luggage
on the basis of suspicious conduct, rather than probable cause.
No case had ever gone that far before. Judge Thornberry, in
his dissenting opinion, was noticeably alarmed at the far reaching decision by the majority.200 Reviewing previous less than
probable cause searches, he concluded:
None of them authorized retrieval and search of a distant piece
of luggage or other distant property on the basis of facts creating only suspicion of wrongdoing.201
He further compared the majority's holding with the holding
in Chimel v. California 2 and concluded that "[e] ven a probablecause arrest of a suspect would not legitimate a search of his
checked luggage as incident to the arrest. 2 0 3 Thus, using the
rationale of the great danger which skyjacking represents, the
court has upheld an unlimited search, heretofore unknown under
circumstances presenting less than probable cause for search
and seizure.
The Terry doctrine stands as the most significant exception
to the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment. It
is not surprising, therefore, that courts have attempted to bring
airport searches within its rationale. However, under the currently prevailing conditions at airports, Terry has been removed
from its factual setting. For, if the reasonableness of a search
19S United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States
v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d
666 (7th Cir. 1973).
,99 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973).
20o Id. at 515-18.
201 Id. at 517.
202 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
20

484 F.2d at 517.
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is to be measured solely by the urgency of the government's interest, without requiring facts to warrant the intrusion, the
concepts of reasonable suspicion and probable cause become
dependent upon and defined by each new public crisis to the
point where the protections afforded by the fourth amendment
no longer exist.
I do not believe that Terry can constitutionally be expanded
to cover the airport anti-hijacking situation, and attempts to do
so can only lead to a potentially serious dilution of the protections embodied in the fourth amendment. Terry, anchored to
the ability of the experienced police officer to recognize suspicious
conduct, was not meant to be extended to the inarticulate
hunches supplied by the behavioral profile and magnetometer as
interpreted by airline personnel unschooled in the nuances of
law enforcement. Nevertheless, if the present screening system
is to be discarded, an alternative strategy must be devised to
protect air commerce from the unacceptable risk of skyjacking.
The airline industry claims that policing the airports is a
responsibility of the federal government. 204 On the other hand,
the federal government alleges that it is the responsibility of the
airlines to provide the necessary funding for law enforcement at
the airport. 20 5 It is my opinion that law enforcement should not
be left to the airlines, but rather should be put in the hands of
experienced law enforcement officials who could perhaps, though
not likely in light of past experience, operate within the constitutional limitations imposed on searches by the fourth amendment and on frisks by Terry.20° I would prefer a solution which
would "not leave an airport and its environs an enclave where
20 7
the Fourth Amendment has taken its leave.
There have been various proposals offered for solving the
threat of skyjacking.
Since fourth amendment constitutional rights may be waived
by consent, as long as that consent is unequivocal and unambiguous, and not in any way the result of fraud, duress or
coercion,2 0 8 it has been suggested that a passenger's right to air
travel could be conditioned on his consenting to being searched
prior to embarkation. 20 9 Under the current system, the consent rationale advanced by the Government does not amount to
consent freely and voluntarily given, inasmuch as the passenger
204
205

See 118 CONG. REc. 15, 622 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1972).

See Id.

See in general, McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures
A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORD. L. REV. 293, 320-21 (1972).
207 480 F.2d at 414.
208 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
209 Cf. Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 1039, 1046-47 (1971) ;328 F. Supp. at 1093. Contra, United
States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
20G

-
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is unaware of his waiver. The current procedure thus falls
outside the contours of the fourth amendment. However, if the
airline ticket agent were to inform the passenger that he must
consent to a weapons search before boarding the aircraft, the
passenger's decision to board would operate as a valid waiver of
his fourth amendment rights. A final assurance that the consent to search is freely and voluntarily given could be obtained
by the execution of a written consent form at the time the ticket
is purchased. Furthermore, the signs which now advise boarding passengers of a possible search should be retained. The
consent procedure suggested above would satisfy the constitutional requirements that a consent to be searched must be knowingly and voluntarily given.
However, this general consent approach raises the question
whether the constitutional right to travel may be predicated on
the relinquishment of fourth amendment rights. 210 It is hardly
persuasive to suggest that there are alternative modes of travel
since, in many situations, flying may be the only practical means
of transportation.
Another proposal has been to place airport searches in a
sui generis position analogous to border searches.211 Border
searches have been held to qualify as express exceptions to the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment -

" 'unsup-

ported' or 'mere' suspicion alone is sufficient to justify [a border]
1 21
search for purposes of customs law enforcement. 2
Airport searches are arguably analogous to border searches
in that the objective in each case is the discovery of contraband
rather than the detection of past crime. 21 However, it must
be recognized that, historically, border searches have applied
only to persons entering the country, not to those traveling
within or leaving it.214 Placing airport searches in a special
category would certainly be a more direct and effective approach
to the problem than the present ineffective and unconstitutional
expansion of the Terry rationale.
"Air hijacking will cease to be a problem when the nations
of the world agree to refuse sanctuary and to return the sky' 21
jacker to the prosecuting authorities in his own country.
Although such an achievement is possible, it is highly improbable. Hence, we are left with no other alternative than impleSee United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
See notes 114-16 and accompanying text, supra.
212 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
213 Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1039, 1050-51 (1971).
14 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
*1541 FORD. L. REV. 293, 324.
210
211
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menting a constitutional airport search procedure which could
be applied uniformly throughout this country. The United
States Supreme Court should take cognizance of the diversity of
decisions within the several circuits and afford them guidance
by deciding this airport search issue once and for all. It is
submitted that only the Supreme Court can end the prevailing
practice, engaged in by the various circuits, of justifying the
unlimited searches at airports on the rationale of Terry.
However, until the day when international cooperation completely forecloses asylum to the skyjacker, the suggested consent
procedure would substantially facilitate the attainment of the
ultimate goal of protecting the passengers and crews of our
nation's airlines, without curtailing any of their constitutional
rights.
Michael M. Blotnik

